INTRODUCTION
On August 24, 2006, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approved Plan B, the brand-name drug sold for emergency contraception, for sale to pharmacy customers eighteen and over without a prescription. 3 For the first time in FDA history, "a The author would like to thank Professor Caitlin E. Borgmann for her invaluable guidance in developing this Comment and for her position as an inspirational role model for feminist law students. The author would also like to thank Professor Ruthann Robson for her support and guidance through the writing and editing process. The author would finally like to thank the pro-choice activist community for its tireless efforts to improve access to emergency contraception. Making Plan B available without a prescription has helped to prevent unwanted and unintended pregnancies for countless women, including the author, and has facilitated the self-determination required to plan whether and when to have a family to women everywhere. For these reasons, access to Plan B is a legal issue that merits attention and requires continued examination and advocacy against discriminatory restriction of access. In its letter to the manufacturer of Plan B, which requested Plan B's approval for overthe-counter use, the FDA decided that "Plan B is safe and effective for use under the conditions set forth in the draft labeling submitted on August 23, 2006. This application is approved, effective on the date of this letter, to allow OTC availability of Plan B for consumers 18 years and older. Plan B remains available by prescription only for women 17 years and younger." Id. at 2. The letter further determined that "[t]he sponsor and third party distributors, wholesalers, and chain drug companies will only
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[Vol. 11:401 drug for which no prescription is required is available only in pharmacies and health clinics." 4 Further, by regulation, Plan B must be shelved behind the pharmacy counter; thus, a customer over the age of eighteen seeking this medication must still ask a pharmacist for it and show photo identification with proof of age in order to obtain it. 5 A pharmacist with a "moral" or religious objection to emergency contraception can, therefore, still pose a barrier to a customer seeking to obtain it. 6 My purpose in writing this Comment is to challenge both the actions of refusing pharmacists and the rule itself from a feminist legal perspective by mapping out a litigation strategy for women affected by the rule's shortcomings.
In this Comment, I argue that the regulation permitting behind-the-counter sale of Plan B to customers over the age of eighteen precludes women from taking full advantage of the reproductive health services available to them, interferes with their right to choose whether and when to have children, and treats women differently than men as users of the medication while paradoxically on the same footing as purchasers. This Comment addresses two problems with the regulation. First, because the rule permits only behind-the-counter (rather than pure over-thecounter) sale of Plan B, pharmacists are in a unique position to decide whether they think the customer should receive the requested medication. Second, the rule surreptitiously adds an age requirement that was neither contemplated by the manufacturer distribute Plan B to licensed pharmacies or other licensed healthcare clinics. As a result, Plan B will not be sold at gas stations or convenience stores. Given that Plan B will have both Rx and OTC [over-the-counter] labeling, the pharmacies will keep Plan B behind-the-counter." Id. at 3. 4 Brief of Plaintiffs, Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp Dec. 14, 2006) . True over-the-counter medications, by contrast, are "drugs that are available to consumers without a prescription" and those that "can be used without the help of a health care practitioner." Over-the-Counter Drug Products, http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/otcintro.htm (last visited Mar. 
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nor medically justified, which hinders the access of young women and women without the required identification. Part I of this Comment begins with an overview of Plan B as a drug, including a brief summary of the passage of the rule that allows behind-the-counter sale of Plan B, and considers its role in a larger political movement in which conservative lawmakers have attacked a woman's right to choose whether and when to have children from every imaginable perspective-including opposition to ordinary contraceptives. Part I also provides a feminist legal perspective to restrictions on women's reproductive choice. Part II of this Comment considers three broad ways to think about challenging the problem of pharmacy refusals, using New York law as a model. This Part explores various theories of relief upon which women who have been denied over-the-counter emergency contraception by a pharmacist exercising moral, instead of medical, judgment may recover. Part II concludes by considering the First Amendment implications of holding pharmacists civilly liable for refusing to dispense emergency contraception. Part III of this Comment discusses a lawsuit which challenges the rule's age restriction, problematizing in particular the way in which the age restriction privileges both age (adults) and gender (male purchasers/ non-users) in ways that are unrelated to the use of the drug or its risks. Part III concludes by reintegrating a feminist legal theoretical perspective to the argument that the age restriction is unwarranted and by reiterating the importance of a feminist legal agenda that can affect change in women's lives.
I. BACKGROUND
The problem of pharmacist refusals is situated culturally in a time in which interrelated fears of non-procreative sex and sexually independent women are particularly pervasive and politicized.
7 It has not just been emergency contraception that has received vigorous opposition from the religious right; cultural conservatives steadfastly oppose comprehensive sex education and virtually all 7 See generally CRISTINA PAGE, HOW THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT SAVED AMERICA: FREEDOM, POLITICS AND THE WAR ON SEX (2006). Page explicitly rejects the notion of isolated, individual pharmacists acting on their own moral imperatives in denying emergency contraception and instead points to a broader cultural phenomenon: "[T]hese are not random acts. Behind each are the force and rhetoric of the pro-life movement." Id. at 3-4. Page argues that the conservative right's stance on abortion has blossomed into a war on birth control, sex education, and non-procreative sex in general in an effort to "end the lifestyle in which people have sex just for pleasure." Id. at 6, 29.
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[Vol. 11:401 forms of birth control, including the condom. 8 Indeed, in a time where federal guidelines suggest women of child-bearing age, and the medical professionals treating them, to be "pre-pregnant,"
9 it is not surprising that the religious right has supported measures that would prevent or severely debilitate access to emergency contraception. Opponents of over-the-counter emergency contraception have argued that it is unsafe, 10 will help spread sexually transmitted diseases, 11 causes abortions, 12 and even will encourage women to 8 Id. at 83-97. Page argues that the anti-choice movement relies on faulty data to support its contention that condom use fails to protect against HIV transmission. Id. at 83-85. The pro-life movement often cites a "31% failure rate" statistic based on a flawed University of Texas study on HIV transmission rates and condom use that was later corrected by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Id. at 83. Page argues that the pro-life movement ignores science because it "fears that the availability of effective disease-prevention methods will undermine its larger agenda, promoting a world in which people are either abstinent or making babies." Id. at 85. See also Condom Warnings-Beware!!!, http://www.prolife.com/condoms.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007) (claiming that "[t]he average condom failure rate in the 11 [University of Texas] studies for preventing transmission of the AIDS virus was 31%" and "a variety of studies have found that condoms have an 'annual failure rate' of 10% to 36% when it comes to preventing pregnancy"); UNITED FOR LIFE, COULD CONDOMS LEAK HIV? (2003) , http://www.unitedforlife.com (follow Leaflets hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 24, 2007) ("Since women can only get pregnant during 5-7 days, (1/4) of their 28 day menstrual cycle, and cannot get pregnant during the other 21 days, these condom failure rates could be multiplied by four to get the 'overall failure rate' which gives at least a 60% failure rate for the average population of condom users and at least an 80% failure rate for young teenagers."). This cultural conservativism is reflected in federal funding for abstinence programs. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women's Sexuality, 56 EMORY L.J. 1235, 1259-60 (2007) (describing "abstinence-only-until-marriage" programs which are "required to suppress all information about condoms and other modern forms of contraception, except failure rates."). 11 PAGE, supra note 7, at 113 (noting that forty-nine pro-life members of Congress urged President Bush in a letter to reject Barr's application to make Plan B available over the counter because "easier access to EC 'may ultimately result in significant increases in cancer, infertility, and HIV/AIDS.' "). See also GAUL & GACEK, supra note
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fabricate rape allegations in order to obtain emergency contraception in the hospital.
13
In reality, the concerns of opponents of over-the-counter emergency contraception are largely overstated and serve to mask the need for unencumbered access to Plan B. Plan B is safe and effective.
14 Plan B does not cause abortions. 15 Plan B works by preventing the release of an egg from the ovary, or by preventing fertilization or implantation, and does not affect an already-fertil- 28, 2008) . The findings of the Kentucky ACLU after doing a survey of state pharmacies was that "[s]ix counties offered no access to Plan B at all. This is a serious problem for any woman seeking a time sensitive medication, but especially for women in rural areas where the closest pharmacy with Plan B in stock could be 100 miles away." Id. See also NARAL PRO-CHOICE WASHINGTON FOUNDATION, 2008 EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION ACCESS PROJECT REPORT, http://www.prochoicewashington.org/ assets/files/ecaccessprojectfactsheet.pdf ("In rural areas, the distance between pharmacies can be a serious burden. The availability, time and cost of transportation are all factors that can negatively impact a woman's ability to travel to multiple pharmacies in hopes of receiving a needed, time-sensitive medication.").
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United States alone. 22 Convenient and unencumbered access to emergency contraception is also vital for survivors of rape.
23
Attempts to limit women's access to emergency contraception are not related to science, they are not about medicine, and they are not about protecting women's health. Beneath the rhetoric about drug safety and concern about sexually transmitted diseases (but without providing any real options about disease prevention beyond abstinence) 24 lies a deep-seated fear of sexually autonomous women making choices about their bodies and their lives. 25 The ideological encouragement and legal support of barriers to access to emergency contraception is a telling illustration of the religious right's thinly-veiled contempt for women.
26
A. The Morning-After Conspiracy
27
The process by which Plan B obtained behind-the-counter approval from the FDA was both highly politicized and highly gendered.
28 Distrust and disdain for women are apparent in the saga of Plan B's approval for behind-the-counter purchase. This section provides a brief overview of the irregularities in the FDA's decisionmaking regarding making Plan B available over-thecounter. 24 See, e.g., PAGE, supra note 7, at 69-70 (discussing abstinence-only programs in Texas during Bush's term as governor).
25 See generally id. at 121-44 ("They [pro-life groups such as Population Research Institute] feared that women, availing themselves of family planning, might participate as equals in society. The real worry was that these women would become independent and ambitious, thinking and acting for themselves.") Id. at 143. 26 See id. 27 The Morning-After Pill conspiracy is a "coalition of feminist organizations that have been leading the grassroots charge to make the morning-after pill available overthe-counter for all women." DARA MAYERS, CTR. FOR 28 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 8, at 1239-54 (arguing that "[s]exual regulation has always been gendered" as manifested in paternity laws, obscenity jurisprudence, and the criminalization of sex toys).
29 For a more in-depth analysis of the FDA's process in reviewing the Plan B applications for over-the-counter approval, see PAGE, supra note 7, at 99-119. See also Gil-
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Plan B was first approved for prescription use in 1999. 30 In 2001, the Center for Reproductive Rights, on behalf of a group of women's health and medical associations, filed a Citizen's Petition requesting that the FDA switch Plan B and another emergency contraceptive drug, Preven, from prescription to over-the-counter status. 31 The FDA delayed action on this "switch" petition for five years and finally denied it on June 9, 2006. 32 This denial was issued during discovery in Tummino v. von Eschenbach, 33 filed on January 21, 2005, in which plaintiffs challenged the FDA's failure to make Plan B available over-the-counter for women of all ages.
In April 2003, Women's Capital Corporation submitted an application to the FDA requesting the same relief from the FDA: approval of Plan B for pure over-the-counter ("OTC") use. 34 In December 2003, FDA's joint advisory committee voted to approve this application in a vote of twenty-three to four. 35 Additionally, FDA review staff "agreed that Plan B should be granted OTC status." 36 However, on May 6, 2004, the Acting Director for the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research signed a letter denying this application, in direct conflict with the recommendations of the two FDA committees. 37 The Government Accountability Office ("GAO") reviewed the FDA's "not-approvable" decision because of these inconsistencies. 38 In reviewing this decision, the GAO found that:
[F]our aspects of FDA's review process were unusual: officials who would normally have been responsible for signing an action letter disagreed with the decision and did not sign the not-approvable letter for Plan B; high-level management was more in- 
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volved than for other OTC switch applications; conflicting accounts exist of whether the decision to not approve the application was made before the reviews were completed; and the rationale for the not-approvable decision was novel and did not follow FDA's traditional practices.
39
In addition to the decision's departure from the FDA's usual administrative procedures generally, the decision also departed from the FDA's particular patterns with respect to switch applications: the GAO concluded that "the decision not to approve the Plan B OTC switch application was not typical of the other 67 prescription-to-OTC switch decisions made from 1994 through 2004." 40 The fourth aspect of the FDA's decisionmaking that was unusual, according to the GAO, is perhaps most troubling. A part of the novelty of the decision involved the FDA's use of assumptions, not data, about adolescent use of Plan B.
41 For example, in providing support for its decision to deny the switch application, the Acting Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER") expressed concerns that "increased access to Plan B could potentially result in an increase in unsafe sexual activity, particularly among younger adolescents." 42 The CDER Acting Director also noted that younger adolescents constitute an "age group . . . that has a tendency to engage in risky behaviors because of their level of cognitive development."
43 This is particularly troubling because adolescents had, in fact, been studied to determine whether they could safely take Plan B-and the adolescents studied were able to comprehend the label just as well as adult women. 44 These assumptions have translated into decreased access to Plan B for young women.
Another aspect of the approval process that caused concern among reproductive rights advocates was President Bush's decision to fill the vacancies on the FDA's Reproductive Health Drugs Com- 39 Id. at 13. 40 Id. at 5. 41 It is crucial to ensure young women have access to contraceptive services, as various factors particular to young women, including age, income, and family relationships, interact in contributing to the prevalence of teen pregnancy.
42 G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 34, at 23. 43 Id. at 23. 44 PAGE, supra note 7, at 111 ("Females from twelve to fifty had been sampled, including seventy-six between twelve and sixteen years old. Adolescents understood 60 to 97 percent of the drug-product package directions and materials, at a comprehension level similar to that of women as a whole and one that easily met standards previously accepted for the approval of other over-the-counter drugs." (citation omitted)).
410
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 11:401 mittee with pro-life appointees, 45 appointments that played an important role in the FDA's delay in reviewing applications to bring Plan B over-the-counter. 46 Numerous statements, made by FDA officials, suggest that the decision-making process was influenced by conservative political and even religious ideologies, rather than the tenets of science and medicine. For example, Dr. W. David Hager, a pro-life obstetrician-gynecologist appointed to serve on the FDA's Reproductive Health Drugs Committee, gave a speech six months after the FDA's initial rejection of the over-the-counter switch application, saying:
I was asked to write a minority opinion that was sent to the commissioner of the FDA . . . I argued from a scientific perspective, and God took that information, and he used it through this minority report to influence the decision. Once again, what Satan meant for evil, God turned into good. 47 Another FDA official, Dr. Janet Woodcock, was reported to have told a group of FDA employees-regarding agency concerns about approving Plan B for over-the-counter use-that "'we could not anticipate or prevent extreme promiscuous behaviors such as the medication taking on 'urban legend' status that would lead adolescents to form sex-based cults centered around the use of Plan B.'" 48 Overall, the way in which the FDA handled the over-thecounter switch application was palpably suspicious. Revealingly, U.S. Magistrate Judge Viktor Pohorelsky, in granting the Tummino plaintiffs' request to subpoena certain White House documents, ruled that the plaintiffs demonstrated a "strong preliminary showing of 'bad faith or improper behavior'" by the FDA in its decisionmaking around Plan B.
49 Feminist legal theorists may view the FDA decision as indicative of more than just bad faith, however: the agency's conduct may be symptomatic of the broader dilemma 45 Id. at 104-05. 46 Id. at 104-06 (President Bush appointed Dr. Joseph Sanford, a physician who "refuses to prescribe the birth control pill because he believes it is 'incompatible with Christian values' "; Dr. Susan Crockett, co-author of the essay, "Using Hormone Contraceptives Is a Decision Involving Science, Scripture, and Conscience"; and Dr. W. David Hager, who reportedly refuses to prescribe contraceptives to unmarried women, chairs the Physicians Resources Council at Focus on the Family, and advises Concerned Women for America and the Medical Institute for Sexual Health in their campaign against the condom). 47 
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A PLAN C FOR PLAN B 411 facing women's rights advocates in which, time and time again, legal norms disregard the realities and complexities of women's lives. At the very least, the ways in which the FDA decision privileged antiquated views about women's and girls' sexuality along with the ideological agenda of a conservative presidential administration over science, medicine, and women's health offers support for the feminist critique of the law as an inherently patriarchal institution.
B. A Feminist Critique of Barriers to Reproductive Choice
Feminist legal theorists argue that access to reproductive services is fundamental to women's equality. 50 In doing so, these feminists affirm that the ability to wholly control family planning affects a broad range of issues of import to women's lives, including education, employment opportunities, women's general health and well-being, and sexual freedom. 51 Thus, a feminist legal analysis of reproductive rights examines and challenges the ways in which the laws burdening reproductive choice rely on archaic stereotypes of "women's place" in the home. 52 Reproductive choice recognizes that women do not exist merely to care for others and recognizes women's decisional autonomy to make the best choices for themselves and their families. crucially affects women's health and sexual freedom, their ability to enter and end relationships, their education and job training, their ability to provide for their families, and their ability to negotiate work-family conflicts in institutions organized on the basis of traditional sex-role assumptions that this society no longer believes fair to enforce, yet is unwilling institutionally to redress."). 52 MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 1312-13 ("After childbirth, women tend to be the ones who are primarily responsible for the intimate care of offspring-their own and those of others. Social custom, pressure, exclusion from well-paying jobs, the structure of the marketplace, and lack of adequate daycare have exploited women's commitment to and caring for children and relegated women to this pursuit which is not even considered an occupation but an expression of the X chromosome.").
53 See Siegel, supra note 51, at 819.
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The feminist critique of barriers to women's reproductive choice also problematizes the patriarchal norms which simultaneously privilege women's domestic responsibility and tolerate men's sexual irresponsibility, and connect those norms to legal, social, and institutional barriers to reproductive choice. For example, legal scholar Cornelia Pillard notes that "[p]eople generally still view child rearing as women's gratification and their domain, and accept men's failure to do [so] and value it as personal, private choice, off-limits to criticism." 54 Similarly, legal scholar Kim Shayo Buchanan notes that "[t]he legal coercion of sexual morality is typically interpreted in a way that requires the control, surveillance, and punishment of women, but rarely of men." 55 Some feminists have argued that a sex equality standpoint on reproductive rights is crucial in that it enables people to see "how reproductive rights are a hinge pin between liberty and equality."
56
Constitutional law scholar Reva Siegel argues that "[a] sex equality analysis of reproductive rights views the social organization of reproduction as playing a key role in determining women's status and welfare and insists-custom notwithstanding-that government regulate relationships at the core of the gender system in ways that respect the equal freedom of men and women." 57 Siegel further argues that a sex equality standpoint on reproductive rights simultaneously problematizes the way in which "custom" shapes the sex roles of men and women and destabilizes the gendered norms that structure parenting. 58 Feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon, also arguing from a sex equality standpoint, demands a recontextualization of pregnancy from the point of view of the pregnant woman. 59 Finally, the sex equality standpoint "appreci-54 Pillard, supra note 2, at 943. See also Buchanan, supra note 8, at 1239-40 ("While the law extends a marked solicitude to the right of men to have nonmarital sex without incurring unwanted reproductive consequences, it visits the legal, financial, health, and reproductive burdens of unmarried sex exclusively on women and attributes the disparate treatment to nature.") (citations omitted). 55 Buchanan, supra note 8, at 1241. 56 Pillard, supra note 2, at 941. Pillard continues, "Women need practical access to a range of reproductive choices to enjoy sex equality, yet they need equality to make reproductive decisions freely and in ways that are responsible to themselves, those they love, and the broader society." Id.
57 Siegel, supra note 51, at 815. 58 See id. at 817-18. 59 MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 1309 ("Grounding a sex equality approach to reproductive control requires situating pregnancy in the legal and social context of sex inequality and capturing the unique relationship between the pregnant woman and her fetus. . . . The social conception of pregnancy that has formed the basis for its legal treatment has not been from the point of view of the pregnant woman, but rather from the point of view of the observing outsider, gendered male.").
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A Broadening the services considered to exist in the "bundle" of reproductive rights to include contraceptive equity issues necessarily recognizes that "the unwantedness of a pregnancy and the demand for abortion do not occur in a vacuum." 61 Feminists oppose laws which restrict access to contraception "to the extent that such laws presuppose or entrench customary, gender-differentiated norms concerning sexual expression and parenting."
62 Some feminists also stress the importance of contraceptive access because of the comparable benefits of pregnancy prevention over abortion. 63 Thus, in viewing contraceptive access issues with a feminist lens, it is clear that "[t]he law should clearly affirm women's right to use contraception to control when and whether they become pregnant as an indispensable element of sex equality."
64
Various aspects of the passage of the FDA rule permitting behind-the-counter sale of Plan B-from the time it took for the agency to review the switch application to the way the rule itself characterizes and patronizes young women-provide support for the feminist critique of legal standards which burden women's reproductive choice. The slow pace the agency took in reviewing the various switch applications suggests that politics-not women's health-are the primary motivation of governmental decision-making; these politics have a disdain for sexual autonomy and independence of women. The fact that the agency declined to follow its own procedures in order to impede access to Plan B demonstrates the government's refusal to "[e]qually meet[ ] women's health needs, whether they are the same as men's or distinctive . . .
[which] is a critical aspect of treating women as equal human beings."
65 Finally, the behind-the-counter status granted to Plan B transferred the power from the hands of the woman-consumer to 60 Siegel, supra note 51, at 819. 61 Pillard, supra note 2, at 943. 62 Siegel, supra note 51, at 821. 63 See, e.g., Pillard, supra note 2, at 963 ("Compared to abortion, contraception is generally safer, easier on women's bodies, more private, less expensive, and draws fewer religious or moral objections.") (footnote omitted). 64 Id. at 942. 65 Id. at 964 (identifying contraceptive inequality based on gender in the context of health insurance coverage). See also MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 1323 ("Sex equality would be advanced if women were permitted to control sexual access to their bodies long before an unwanted pregnancy.").
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[Vol. 11:401 the hands of the pharmacist, without providing protections to women for pharmacist refusals. The next section explores the problem of pharmacist refusals-a problem whose roots lie in the FDA rulemaking itself, as the FDA without any medical rationale invented Plan B's behind-the-counter status. 66 This section explores this problem from a legal advocacy perspective, considering the various causes of action that could be asserted against a refusing pharmacist.
II. THE OBLIGATION OF PHARMACISTS TO DISPENSE LAWFULLY REQUESTED MEDICATIONS: EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE AGAINST A REFUSING PHARMACIST
One of the ways in which the rule providing for behind-thecounter access to emergency contraception is flawed is that it provides an opportunity for pharmacists to let a religious or moral objection to emergency contraception interfere with their obligation to dispense lawfully requested medication. This section's aim is to provide a litigation strategy to challenge such pharmacist refusals in a number of different contexts, using New York state law as a model. Each theory of relief has its strengths and has its shortcomings, but they all strive to hold refusing pharmacists accountable for breaching a duty owed to the customer. In discussing the potential forms of relief for a pharmacy customer who has been refused Plan B, this section considers professional causes of action, including professional misconduct and patient abandonment or neglect; administrative causes of action; and private causes of action, including sex discrimination, wrongful conception, and breach of fiduciary duty. This section concludes by considering the relationship between the causes of action discussed and the First Amendment implications of challenging pharmacist refusals.
A. Professional Causes of Action
On August 15, 2006, the New York Civil Liberties Union ("NYCLU") filed a complaint with the Office of the Professions at the New York State Department of Education, the state agency responsible for regulating the licensing of pharmacists and the investigation of professional misconduct, against three pharmacists who refused to refill prescriptions for emergency contraception prescribed by a medical professional. 67 The complaint alleges respon- 68 Although emergency contraception is now available behind the counter for patients over the age of eighteen, the professional causes of action alleged in the complaint are viable theories of relief for women who have been refused emergency contraception when they try to obtain it from a pharmacist.
To file a complaint against a pharmacist, an aggrieved customer may fill out a complaint form available at the Office of the Profession's web site. 69 The relief available under a professional cause of action is professional sanctions. 70 Pharmacists are authorized to refuse to dispense a prescription if, in their professional judgment, "potential adverse effects, interactions or other therapeutic complications could endanger the health of the patient." 75 This language suggests that the scope of a pharmacist's discretion is confined to the health and safety of the patient.
Denial of over-the-counter emergency contraception based on the pharmacist's moral or religious beliefs is clearly beyond the authorized scope of the profession, as such beliefs are not at all re- lated to the health of the patient. 76 Thus, pharmacists who refuse to provide customers emergency contraception, without providing immediate and realistic alternatives, are committing professional misconduct and are subject to the sanctions prescribed by regulation. For example, the respondent pharmacists named in the NYCLU complaint allegedly refused to honor the complaining patients' refill prescriptions because women needing emergency contraception were "being irresponsible" and that obtaining emergency contraception "should be inconvenient" for women. 77 In doing so, the respondent pharmacists were substituting their own subjective and judgmental opinions about the patient for that which is authorized by law-professional judgment relating to the patient's health. As the NYCLU argued, these types of assumptions "are based on unjustified and unsupported judgments about the women's sexual behavior"
78 and "impl[y] the view that women who need [emergency contraception] deserve to get pregnant."
79
Pharmacists' refusals of this type are inherently embedded with these types of problematic assumptions about the customer's sexual "irresponsibility" or practices and as such are beyond the authorized scope of the pharmacists' practice. Additionally, refusals based on sincerely held religious opposition to emergency contraception likely also amount to professional misconduct because such opposition is not related to the health of the patient. Accordingly such pharmacist refusals likely constitute professional misconduct under New York rules and regulations. 
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ing to fill a prescription without providing a prompt referral constitutes "abandonment and neglect" within the meaning of the regulation. 82 This guideline provides that "the pharmacist has a professional obligation to take appropriate steps to avoid the possibility of abandoning or neglecting a patient" when that pharmacist recognizes a moral belief will pose a barrier to filling a patient's prescription. 83 Thus a pharmacist's morally based refusal to allow a customer to purchase Plan B, without ensuring that another pharmacist can provide the customer with Plan B as soon as possible, would likely constitute unprofessional conduct proscribed by New York rules and regulations.
A customer who was denied emergency contraception, then, could file a complaint with the Office of the Professions alleging the pharmacist committed professional misconduct and abandoned or neglected a patient. A customer may want to do this in order to save the time and expense of litigation: filing a complaint is simple and does not require an attorney. 84 On the other hand, the prospect of professional sanctions-which include suspension, revocation, or annulment of the pharmacist's license and fines 85 -may not feel like an adequate remedy for a woman who has been denied emergency contraception, as they may punish the refusing pharmacist but do nothing to remedy the harm she personally suffered.
B. Administrative Remedies
Unlawful Sex Discrimination in Public Accommodations
By New York regulation, it is illegal to discriminate on the basis of sex in a place of public accommodation. 86 A pharmacy is governed under these regulations as a place of public accommodation, as the statute governs "wholesale and retail stores and estab- The provisions of the state anti-discrimination law are enforced through the New York State Division of Human Rights ("DHR"). To file a complaint with the DHR, the aggrieved person must submit a complaint which indicates the name and address of the person alleged to have committed the unlawful discriminatory practice complained of and describing the discriminatory practice. 89 The agency then has 180 days to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent engaged in unlawful discriminatory practice. 90 If the probable cause standard is met, the respondent will then be required to report to a hearing conducted by the DHR. 91 After the hearing, the DHR commissioner has 180 days to determine whether the respondent committed the alleged unlawful discrimination. 92 The statute also prescribes a one-year statute of limitations. 93 Complainants may obtain judicial review of agency orders, including cease and desist orders, orders awarding damages, and orders dismissing complaints.
94
New York courts also have jurisdiction to hear claims of unlawful discrimination. 95 However, once a complainant elects the administrative forum by filing a complaint with the DHR, a judicial action on the same complaint is generally barred. 96 There are 87 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9). 88 See N.Y.C.L.U. compl., supra note 67, at 13. In their complaint, the NYCLU alleged that refusal to honor refills of emergency contraception prescriptions constitutes sex discrimination because only women use emergency contraception. The NYCLU further analogized refusal to honor refill prescriptions of emergency contraception to refusal to provide insurance coverage for contraception, which some courts have found violates federal law under Title VII. Id. 90 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(2)(a). 91 Id. § 297(4)(a). 92 Id. § 297(4)(a). 93 Id. § 297(5). 94 Id. § 298. 95 Id. § 297(9). The private cause of action based on sex discrimination is discussed in Section IV, infra. 
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three exceptions to this rule: the election of remedies rule does not apply where the division dismissed a complaint on the grounds of administrative convenience, on the grounds of untimeliness, or on the grounds that the election of remedies is annulled.
97
In order to have standing to file a complaint alleging unlawful discrimination, the complainant must be an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of the statute. 98 Courts have interpreted the statute's "aggrieved person" to mean " [an] individual who is the alleged victim of the alleged discriminatory practice."
99 Additionally, organizations have institutional standing to file a complaint so long as the complainant is a "bona fide recognized organization representing that class with a specific interest in the litigation in question."
100
In making the initial determination whether to proceed with a hearing, the DHR must determine whether there is probable cause to believe the alleged discriminatory practice occurred.
101 A "rational basis" for sustaining the complaint is sufficient in order to satisfy this probable cause standard. 102 If there is no probable cause to believe that the respondent has engaged in unlawful discriminatory practice, the DHR is authorized to dismiss the complaint.
103
If the commissioner finds that the respondent engaged in unlawful discriminatory practice, she retains broad discretionary powers to grant relief "reasonably related to the discriminatory conduct." 104 The commissioner is authorized to issue a cease and desist order, award compensatory damages, and require a compli-
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[Vol. 11:401 ance report. 105 The courts' recognition of the broad discretion of the commissioner accords with "the extremely strong statutory policy of eliminating discrimination" and reflects the notion that a statutory remedy "involves a vindication of both the individual's interests and those of society." 106 A woman over the age of eighteen who is denied emergency contraception by a pharmacist who wishes to elect an administrative, rather than a judicial, remedy could file a complaint with the DHR alleging unlawful sex discrimination. Additionally, reproductive rights organizations are authorized to file complaints on behalf of women affected by this type of discriminatory conduct.
107
Electing the administrative remedy may make sense for a woman who wishes to avoid investing the time and expense required for a lawsuit, while allowing her to assert that the refusing pharmacist's conduct was unlawful and discriminatory. An affected woman would not need to hire an attorney or pay any court fees in order to file a sex discrimination complaint with the DHR. Additionally, this administrative remedy authorizes the DHR to award money damages, which may be more adequate relief, or feel like more "personal" relief, than the professional sanctions authorized when the complainant alleges professional misconduct. Electing the administrative remedy can be a frustratingly slow process-an aggrieved woman could wait almost a year to hear whether the agency agrees that the pharmacist committed unlawful discrimination 108 -but may still be the fastest option for the woman. 108 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(2)(a) ("Within one hundred eighty days after a complaint is filed, the division shall determine whether it has jurisdiction and, if so, whether there is probable cause to believe that the person named in the complaint, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, has engaged or is engaging in an unlawful discriminatory practice."); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(4)(a) ("Within two hundred seventy days after a complaint is filed . . . the division shall cause to be issued and served a written notice, together with a copy of such complaint, as the same may have been amended, requiring the respondent or respondents to answer the charges of such complaint and appear at a public hearing before a hearing examiner at a time not less than five nor more than fifteen days after such service and at a place to be fixed by the division and specified in such notice.").
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C. Private Causes of Action
Unlawful sex discrimination in public accommodations
A woman denied emergency contraception may, instead of electing the administrative remedy and filing a sex discrimination complaint with DHR, elect a judicial remedy. 109 The statutory scheme authorizes New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over a cause of action claiming unlawful discriminatory practice, so long as the plaintiff did not also file a complaint with the DHR.
110 Although there is very little case law that addresses gender-based discrimination in public accommodations, the case law addressing other protected classes is instructive.
The burden is on the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. 111 The cases suggest that this burden is met if the plaintiff establishes that she was subjected to unequal treatment because of her membership in a class protected by New York Human Rights Law. 112 Gender is a protected class under this body of law.
113 New York and federal constitutional precedent "establish[ ] that gender discrimination occurs when men and women are not treated equally and one gender is benefited or burdened as opposed to the other." on medical necessity meets this standard. 116 In Cahill v. Rosa, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated public accommodations law when they refused to treat patients who were known or suspected to be HIV-positive. 117 There, the court held that a medical provider has an ability to refer patients elsewhere for treatment so long as they have a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for doing so. 118 The medical provider in Cahill did not satisfy this standard. 119 Similarly, in North Shore University Hospital v. Rosa, the plaintiffs alleged that New York Public Accommodations Law was violated when defendant medical facility used heightened precautionary measures when it treated a patient it suspected had AIDS. 120 There, the court found that defendant's "strict isolation technique" under its infectious disease protocol was supported by medical justification and therefore constituted a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the difference in treatment.
121 If the presumption of discrimination is rebutted, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the reasons proffered were not the true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.
122
The court's rationale in Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases North General Hospital 123 is instructive in considering discrimination principles in the context of access to emergency contraception. In Elaine W., the plaintiffs instituted an unlawful sex discrimination action alleging that defendant hospital's refusal to admit pregnant women into 734, 736 (1996) (finding a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation in age discrimination suit when plaintiff was terminated due to "business setbacks"). There are obvious drawbacks to commencing a civil action against a refusing pharmacist: litigation is expensive and time-consuming. Litigation may simply not be an option for many women affected by a refusing pharmacist. However, reproductive rights organizations may wish to develop projects whose purpose is to gather information and engage in litigation of this nature. This would alleviate the burden of expense on the plaintiff while simultaneously setting crucial local or state precedent.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
A complaint filed in civil court alleging sex discrimination could also include a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action. Refusing to provide emergency contraception over-the-counter is likely a breach of the fiduciary relationship between the pharmacist and the customer. A New York state court explicitly held that a fiduciary relationship exists between a pharmacist and customer in Anonymous v. CVS Corp. 133 In reaching its conclusion that the pharmacist-customer relationship can correctly be characterized as a fiduciary relationship, the court in CVS also noted that pharmacists "do more than dispense a product. They are responsible for collecting otherwise confidential medical information, and providing drug advice to customers."
134 New York state courts have also defined the applicable standard of care for pharmacists, finding that they must exercise "the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness and vigilance commensurate with the dangers involved and the consequences which may attend inattention." 135 Failure to provide emergency contraception to a customer who shows proof of age is a breach of the pharmacist's duty to the customer. The reasoning of pharmacists who deny emergency contraception to women who request it is not based on any objective medical condition of the customer; rather, such reasoning is based on sexist and paternalistic assumptions about her, or is based on 132 137 indicates that, in the context of the pharmacist's duty of care, any "dangers involved" only apply to the age of the customer. Because the FDA has deemed emergency contraception to be safe and legal for women over the age of eighteen, the only duty the pharmacist owes to a customer requesting Plan B is to verify her age. Virtually any other determinations made by the pharmacist beyond age verification would be non-medical, because the FDA has explicitly approved emergency contraception's safety for women over the age of eighteen, without restrictions on frequency of use. The pharmacist's injection of his or her moral or religious beliefs, or assumptions about the customer's marital status or sexual proclivities, should have nothing to do with the pharmacist's obligation to exercise "the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness and vigilance commensurate with the dangers involved . . . ." 
Wrongful Conception Tort
A woman who became pregnant or had an abortion as a result of a pharmacist's refusal to provide emergency contraception may be able to sue the pharmacist on the tort theory of wrongful conception. New York courts recognize the tort of wrongful conception when a medical professional's negligence results in the birth of a healthy child; 139 however, the courts have so far not explicitly extended the wrongful conception tort to the context of failure to provide emergency contraception.
The New York Court of Appeals has implicitly indicated that the tort of wrongful conception is a viable cause of action when a physician or other medical professional's negligence causes an unwanted pregnancy that results in an otherwise healthy child. 140 1985) . The court noted that plaintiff's second cause of action-"based upon allegations of medical malpractice and [seeking] damages for physical and emotional injuries resulting from labor and delivery and the necessity of a second sterilization procedure"-was also not at issue on appeal, because defendants had conceded. Id. 147 Miller, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 524 ("The gravamen of their suit is what courts and commentators have come to call 'wrongful conception' or 'wrongful pregnancy', i.e., the negligent performance of a sterilization or abortion procedure by a physician, or the negligent filling of a contraceptive prescription by a pharmacist, as a result of which the plaintiffs conceived and became the parents of a healthy but unwanted child." (citation omitted)).
2008]
A PLAN C FOR PLAN B 427
negligence resulted in an unintended pregnancy. 148 The pharmacist owes an adult patient "the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness and vigilance commensurate with the dangers involved and the consequences which may attend inattention."
149 And, because the FDA has deemed emergency contraception to be safe and legal for women over the age of eighteen, the only duty the pharmacist owes to a patient requesting Plan B is to verify that she is in fact eighteen years of age. The pharmacist's infusion of her moral beliefs into the Plan B transaction is an intrinsically non-medical determination. Because the FDA has explicitly approved emergency contraception's safety for women over the age of eighteen, without restrictions on frequency of use, any other inquiry falls outside the duty of care the pharmacist owes the patient.
In terms of damages recoverable, the court in O'Toole explicitly held that plaintiffs in a wrongful conception suit may not seek damages for the ordinary costs of raising a healthy, normal child. 150 The court found that "the birth of a healthy child, as but one consequence of defendant's tortious conduct, does not constitute a harm cognizable at law." 151 The court also based its holding on public policy, stating that " [t] o hold that the birth of a healthy child represents a legal harm would be to engage this court in the jurisprudentially improper task of recasting the immutable, intrinsic value of human life according to the financial burden thus imposed upon the parents." 152 In Weintraub, the court indicated that New York adopts the approach espoused by a majority of other jurisdictions that have considered the wrongful conception cause of action, which is to award damages for medical expenses incurred during the pregnancy, but not for costs associated with raising the child. 153 The Weintraub
428
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:401 court concluded that "[t]here . . . is general agreement that the plaintiffs in a wrongful conception action may recover from the tort-feasor for the expenses of the unsuccessful sterilization procedure, the pain and suffering associated with the pregnancy, the costs of delivery, lost wages, and loss of consortium." 154 The Weintraub court then noted that the majority of jurisdictions deny recovery of child-rearing costs for public policy reasons, to protect the child, and because calculating these damages would be unduly speculative.
155
The biggest obstacle the wrongful conception avenue of relief poses to a customer denied emergency contraception is finding a pregnant plaintiff who either has chosen to have the unwanted child or is willing to seek the cost of an abortion procedure as damages. 156 Thus, for privacy reasons, women may be reluctant to institute a wrongful conception suit. Additionally, complicated policy issues surrounding the notion of ascribing monetary value as damages associated with an unwanted child arise in the context of a wrongful conception claim. 157 For similar reasons discussed by the Weintraub court to support the bar on recovering costs associated with rearing a healthy child-that the courts should not adjudicate the birth of a healthy child as a legally cognizable "injury"
158 -a woman denied emergency contraception may be reluctant to seek damages for pregnancy-related costs.
On the other hand, the wrongful conception cause of actionwhich does not characterize the actual birth of an unwanted child as a legally compensable injury-could be viewed as a practical method of obtaining relief for expenses incurred as a result of a pharmacist's refusal to provide emergency contraception. One theory, which supports recovery under a wrongful conception claim, views "the lost parental opportunity to avoid conception or terminate a pregnancy as the legally cognizant injury, rather than expressly framing the child's life itself as the injury."
159 Thus, by 154 Id. at 638 (citation omitted 
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refusing to award damages for the cost of raising a healthy but unwanted child, as New York does, the legally compensable harm is characterized as the mother's experience, not the child's life. 160 
D. Pharmacist Refusals and the First Amendment: The Impact of Stormans
In light of the court's decision in Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 161 the private causes of action described above may become an increasingly useful tool for women denied emergency contraception by pharmacists. In Stormans, the plaintiffs are two pharmacists whose religious beliefs informed their view that life begins at conception, and who "claim a right of conscience to refuse to dispense Plan B, and to instead refer the patient to a nearby pharmacy that will dispense the drug." 162 Plaintiffs challenged Washington state regulations which provided, in part, that:
Pharmacies have a duty to deliver lawfully prescribed drugs or devices to patients and to distribute drugs and devices approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for restricted distribution by pharmacies, or provide a therapeutically equivalent drug or device in a timely manner consistent with reasonable expectations for filling the prescription. 163 The Washington State Board of Pharmacy acknowledged that the regulations reflected a desire to provide definitive standards for pharmacists in situations where the pharmacist's moral beliefs were at odds with a patient's request for legally prescribed medications. 164 Accordingly, the Board concluded that the regulation prohibits a pharmacy from implementing a policy in which a pharmacist is permitted to refer a patient to another pharmacy to avoid filling a prescription the pharmacist objects to due to moral or ethical reasons. 165 Plaintiffs argued that the challenged regulations violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 166 Under that clause, the government "may not enact laws that suppress religious
